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PHILOSOPHICAL TOYS
AS VECTORS FOR 
DIAGRAMMATIC CREATION: 
THE CASE OF THE 
FRAGMENTED ORCHESTRA
Abstract: ! e central topic of this essay 
consists into establishing a  relation
between two dimensions of formation:
the conceptual process of creating philo-
sophical toys – that is of reelaborating 
existing philosophical concepts, mainly 
deriving from the thought of Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in terms of 
their potential as ‘operative constructs’ 
– and their parallel redeployment 
towards the speci# c problem of analyz-
ing a  recent transdisciplinary artwork
(! e Fragmented Orchestra by Jane
Grant, John Matthias and Nick Ryan).
By means of this strategical shi$ , theory 
looses its character of explanation and 
illustration. Philosophy as toy becomes
rather the matter of evaluating the com-
plexity of a speci# c artistic composition
in terms of its aesthetic potential. It 
contributes towards developing meta-
stable conditions of mutual resonance
between heterogeneous modalities of 
creation.
Keywords: rigorous analogy, 
individuation, conjunctive synthesis,
neuronal plasticity, art and aesthetics
of sound creation
Filoso! cké hračky 
jako vektory diagramatické 
tvorby: 
případ Fragmentovaného
orchestru
Abstrakt: Ústředním motivem této
studie je ustavení vztahu mezi dvěma 
dimenzemi utváření: konceptuálního 
procesu vytváření # loso# ckých hraček 
(tj. přepracování existujících # loso# c-
kých pojmů s ohledem na  jejich poten-
ciál coby „operativních konstruktů“, 
odvozeného zejm. z  myšlení Gillesa 
Deleuze a  Félixe Guattariho) a  jejich 
současného využití pro analýzu nedáv-
ného transdisciplinárního uměleckého 
díla (Fragmentovaného orchestru 
Jane Grant, Johna Matthiase a  Nicka 
Ryana). Díky tomuto strategickému 
posunu ztrácí teorie povahu vysvětlení 
a  ilustrace. Filoso# e se coby hračka 
naopak stává způsobem zhodnocení 
komplexity speci# cké umělecké kompo-
zice z hlediska jejího estetického poten-
ciálu. Přispívá k rozvoji metastabilních 
podmínek vzájemné rezonance mezi 
heterogenními modalitami tvorby.
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Claudia Mongini
„How is it possible to come to massively produce a desire to create, a collective 
generosity, by means of the tenacity, the intelligence and the sensibility proper 
to arts and sciences.”
Félix Guattari
“" e plasticity of time is inscribed in the brain.”
Catherine Malabou
Introduction
! is paper examines the role of philosophical concepts as vehicles for 
knowledge production in relation to an artwork which combines recent sci-
enti" c (neurophysiological and physical) developments into the implemen-
tation of new sonic experiences (! e Fragmented Orchestra by Jane Grant,
John Matthias and Nick Ryan). ! e interest in this work arises from the 
fact that in it scienti" c, technical, sonic and visual forms of experience (and 
not only given results) intrinsically contribute to the emergence of a non-
reductionist dimension of aesthetic expression. In this frame, the role of the 
philosophical concept as toy becomes that of examining the artworks along 
their complex compositional procedures, in order to extract and transpose 
the operative conditions of art towards more general questions concerning 
collective sensibility. ! at is if, as it will be shown," e Fragmented Orchestra
creates the conditions for transposing a physical model1 from the realm of 
neurophysiology towards the aesthetic one in terms of a procedure of de- 
and recomposition of sonic occasions, the task of philosophical tools will be 
that of transferring the operative " eld of scienti" co-aesthetic construction 
proper to the artwork towards the aesthetico-political question of emergence 
of collective sensibility.
! e method adopted here is what Muriel Combes following the thought 
of Gilbert Simondon de" nes as “rigorous analogy”2. Rigorous analogy dis-
misses both the use of visual and linguistic metaphors, as well as the struc-
tural transfer of logical conditions from one epistemic domain to another. It 
is a question of avoiding any form of reductionist similarity deriving from 
the transposition of elements of knowledge conceived as being „already 
1 Eugene IZHIKEVICH – Joe A. GALLY – Gerald M. EDELMAN. “Spike-Timing Dynamics 
of Neuronal Groups.” Cerebral Cortex, vol. 14, 2004, pp. 933–944.
2 Muriel COMBES, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press 2012, p. 10.
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there“ that is, independently from the study of their formation. Rather than 
transferring the whole logical structure of what is already known and taken 
for granted, the emphasis is set onto the problem of re-materialization of 
the logical operations pertaining to an established epistemological domain 
within the realm of a new productive dimension.
" e idea of rigorous analogy is intimately related to the concept of 
individuation, which is understood as the operation leading towards the 
constitution of individuals, that is generic beings. What is signi# cant to 
the current inquiry, is that individuation intimately relates the ontological 
operation of constitution of beings to the epistemological one concerning 
the creation of knowledge. " e “rigour” of analogy derives explicitly from 
conceiving the relation between being and knowledge not in terms of their 
resultant conditions, i.e. the appearances they might take, but of the opera-
tions they are both traversing. According to this approach, analogy becomes 
a matter of “squaring”,3 that is of assigning another dimension of power to 
the intensity of the original discovery. Squaring emphasizes the fact, that it 
is not only the question of establishing a relation between di$ erent forma-
tions of knowledge and of beings, but that the relation has to be conceived in 
terms of a relation of relation: what gets transferred is not only a particular 
result deriving from speci# c procedures of knowledge production, but the 
structural logic determining the modality of individuation in a particular 
case. Furthermore, because of the tight relation between being and knowl-
edge, the idea of squaring does not only refer to the relational character of 
a mathematical operation, but acquires the status of a “physical paradigm”,4
inasmuch as the operation allowing to extract the genetic conditions of 
emergence, is always bound to the material conditions determining the 
speci# city of each case. Muriel Combes observes that the explicit reference 
to physics is “a matter of pinpointing the epistemological role”5 played by 
the notion of the individual; that is, emphasis is set upon the tight relation 
between being in its material development, and the operative dimension of 
knowledge, which it comes both to acquire and to express.
Given these premises, I will proceed in the following way: # rst, I will 
describe! e Fragmented Orchestra in terms of its aesthetic recomposition of 
physical and neurophysiological zones of intensity; I will subsequently in-
troduce philosophical concepts such as disparation and individuation; next, 
3  Ibid., p. 11.
4  Ibid., p. 12.
5  Ibid., p. 13.
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I will relate the heterogeneous dimensions of the artwork and that of the 
concepts by means of the operative dimension of “rigorous analogy”. Last, 
I will address the role of theoretical concepts as toys by examining the " eld 
of problematic tension unfolding between arts and science and philosophy, 
and addressing issues of epistemic creation and collective sensibility.
First Squaring: ! e “tiny brain” as a device of sonic de- and
re-composition
! e Fragmented Orchestra by Jane Grant, John Matthias and Nick Ryan,
interrelates visual, scienti" c and sonic dimensions into complex patters of 
de- and re-composition.
# ese disparate aesthetic compounds are orchestrated together by 
means of transferring in the realm of aesthetics the operative conditions 
of a mathematical model currently implemented in brain research. # is 
model6, accounts for a  quantitative description of the electrical activity 
of single neuronal cells in the brain area called cerebral cortex. # is thin 
section comprising the outermost neuronal layers below the scull, function-
ally accounts for the area where lower information deriving from speci" c 
internal components gets reshaped into the formation of wider and more 
complex patterns of association. It is the locus where sensory and motor 
information is combined and integrated with the cognitive processing of 
thinking and language. In more general terms, and this is important for 
the argumentative line which follows, the cerebral cortex accounts for the 
straightforward relation between levels of perceptual experience and pro-
cesses of abstract composition.
By transposing the functional conditions of mathematics from brain sci-
ence into the realm of art,! e Fragmented Orchestra “squares” – in Muriel 
Combes terminology - the activity of small portions of the cerebral cortex: it
arti" cially reconstructs their dynamics into sonic and visual aesthetic traits.
Signi" cantly, the arti" cial reconstruction of a  small part of cerebral 
cortex, is not a metaphor of the activity of the human brain. “Squaring”
as will be shown, means here to reconstruct another cerebral cortex which 
aesthetically modulates and recombines speci" c levels of expressive and
perceptual experience with forms of abstract reduction (the aesthetic action 
of the involved algorithm).
6  IZHIKEVICH – GALLY – EDELMAN, “Spike-Timing Dynamics of Neuronal Groups.”
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! e work was widely installed across UK between December 2008 and 
February 2009. It consisted of 24 " xed geographical locations, including 
FACT Gallery, Liverpool, University of Plymouth, Landscove Primary 
School, Devon, ! e National Portrait Gallery, London, Millennium Sta-
dium, Cardi#  and Kielder Observatory, Northumberland. At each of the 
locations, a  ‘soundbox’ was installed, which consisted of a  microphone, 
a small computer connected to the internet and a Feonic “drive”, a device 
which transmits audio through resonating architectural surfaces.7
! ese sounds were transmitted across the internet and were microgran-
uled trough the activity of an arti" cially reconstructed 24 neuron “tiny cer-
ebral cortex” situated in the FACT Gallery in Liverpool. ! e activity of the 
cortex was complexi" ed by the introduction of two further computational 
elements responsible for the interconnection between the activity of single 
neurons and thus accounting for the creation of the patterns of association 
which the cerebral cortex is responsible for. Spatial delays in the informa-
tion propagation between neurons were included, which cause a shi%  delay 
in the interconnection between sounds. ! e time-di# erence of the arrival 
of heterogeneous sounds to the “tiny cortex”, was registered by another 
algorithmic component, the so called “Spike Timing dependent Plasticity” 
which accounts for a modulation of the connection strength between the 
single neurons, and thus for a recon" guration of the whole sonic event with-
out erasing the singular speci" city of each sonic occasion related to one of 
the disparate locations. Furthermore, the activity of each arti" cial neuron 
dissolved the incoming sound into sound grains thus adding a further level 
of complexity to the whole design, but doing that trough subtle processes of 
dephasing and decomposition.
While in the gallery, “the audience, weaving their way through the 
space, was able to hear the live composition as a whole and listen to each of 
the sites individually”8, the arti" cial brain also accounted for sending back 
from the gallery sounds to each of the sites scattered in the UK. ! e public 
in the gallery was thus not only invited to listen, but also to compose the 
work by moving through the space, and to take notice of the e# ects of this 
composition on an internet site which registered what was happening on 
each of the heterogeneous geographical places:
7 Jane GRANT – John MATTHIAS, “Shi% ing Topographies: Sound and the Fragmented 
Orchestra.” In: RUGG J. – CRAIG M. (eds.), Spatialities: ! e Geographies of Art and 
Architecture. Bristol: Intellect 2011, p. 50 (50–63).
8 GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi% ing Topographies: Sound and the Fragmented Orchestra,” 
p. 51.
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! e sounds of ! e Fragmented Orchestra will vary according to loca-
tion; wind over Black Fell, inner city tra"  c, chanting from sports stadia and 
the chatter of migrating birds arriving for the winter will be combined with 
incidental and performed sounds from members of the public.9
! e arti# cial cortex becomes a machine in terms which get close to the 
de# nition given by Deleuze and Guattari10: according to them machines are
not to be confused with some predetermined structure, but they constitute 
the mechanisms for creating immanent and transformative relations within 
the realm of speci# c concrete constellations. In the case of the fragmented 
Orchestra, the machine consists in the connection between a layered spatio-
temporal dimension which is on one side extended physically (across UK) but 
whose spatiality solely accounts for the transmission of a non predetermined 
sonic temporal sequence: ”Occasionally, huge sonic ‘waves’ # lled the gallery 
with sound, whilst at other times, smaller more discrete events occurred 
which had to be listened more intently.”11 ! is macroscopic cartography is 
further connected to the microscopic spatiotemporal patterns in the brain of 
the listeners/actors. ! ere, the interplay between the spatial distribution of 
neurons and the evolution of their # rings accounts (among other things), for 
the possibility of the formation of new neuronal junctions (synapses) from 
a di% erent experience of sensation.
! e machinic function of the arti# cial cortex, can be now understood 
more clearly within the realm of the complex relation between the macro-
scopic geographical dimension and the microphysics of brain activity of the 
listener. ! e “tiny cortex” relates the heterogeneic dimensions of disparate 
sounds and neuronal activity, but does this by means of a twofold disjunc-
tion. Grant and Matthias insist that the reconstructed brain cannot generate 
new sound but instead it is “the noise in the system [which] keeps the model 
buoyant and allows to self generate events from previous stimuli”.12 ! e oc-
9  Jane GRANT – John MATTHIAS – Nick RYAN, “! e Fragmented Orchestra – About the 
Project” [online]. 2008. Available at: <http://thefragmentedorchestra.com/about/> [cit. 31. 1. 
2013].
10  Gilles DELEUZE – Felix GUATTARI, A ! ousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis – London: University of Minnesota Press 1987, p. 510–511
11  GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi& ing Topographies: Sound and the Fragmented Orchestra,” 
p. 51.
12  Ibid., p.  60. See also: Jane GRANT – John MATTHIAS – Tim HODGSON – Eduardo 
MIRANDA, “Hearing ! inking.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5484, 2009, p. 237 
(234–240); John MATTHIAS – Jane GRANT – Nick RYAN, “! e Fragmented Orchestra.” In: 
MIAH, A. (ed.), Human Futures: Art in an Age of Uncertainty. Liverpool: FACT – Liverpool 
University Press 2008, p. 73 (71–75).
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currence of this endogenous activity is not a side e" ect but goes along with 
“the central artistic aim” of the project, which is “to a" ect the rupturing of 
the boundaries between the sensed and the action, removing the sensed and 
the sensory part of the “self”.13 # is makes the “tiny cortex” a sonic instru-
ment of its own, its sound being created by a mathematical modelling of 
the neurophysiological property of synaptic plasticity. # e implementation 
of this property via mathematical algorithm, accounts for the fact that the 
microscopic sonic events produced by the $ rings of each neuron, are encour-
aged by the enhancement of a wider range of interneuronal connections.14
# at is, sonic events are on one side the expression of singular nervous cell
activities but at the same time it is those accounting for the construction 
of interrelation patterns between neurons. And furthermore, the aesthetic 
signi$ cance of the tiny cortex arises as we have seen from a will to create 
sensory disconnections, and on the other side it is the machine relating 
geographically distant sounds and brain activities. What are the aesthetic
and philosophical inferences of this artistic strategy? Can this machinic 
(de$ nire) device be translated into an appropriate terminology in order to 
engage with the aesthetic (or aesthetico-political) question of emergence of 
collective sensibility?
I  address these questions by introducing another arti$ cial entity: the 
Simondonian and Deleuzian concepts of disparity and individuation. # e 
idea is to open a problematic $ eld between the aesthetic dimension of ! e
Fragmented Orchestra and the conceptual lenses of philosophy. I will then 
show that when entering in relation with the artwork, the concepts become 
‘toys’, inasmuch as they acquire the function of clinical evaluation of a work 
of art. # is means that philosophy does not account for a  judgement “in 
terms of transcendent or universal criteria”,15 but examines how the con-
ditions of “formation of new blocks of sensation”,16 concur to the creation 
of a new aesthetic world (or, more speci$ cally in this case, a new aesthetic 
brain). What is furthermore important to stress out, is that the “toy” does 
not exist as a pre-given entity since the beginning. Rather, it gets constructed 
13  GRANT – MATTHIAS – HODGSON – MIRANDA, “Hearing # inking,” p. 234.
14 Daniel JONES – Jane GRANT – John MATTHIAS – Tim HODGSON – Nick RYAN – 
Nicholas OUTRAM “# e Fragmented Orchestra.” Proceedings of the International Conference 
on New Interfaces for Musical Expression, vol. 9, 2009, p. 299 (297–302).
15  Daniel W. SMITH, “‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique Et Clinique’ Project.” In:
DELEUZE, G., Essays Critical And Clinical. Minneapolis – London: University of Minnesota
Press 1997, p. liii (i-lvi).
16 Ibid., p. lii.
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in the very process of operative tension with the aesthetic realm. Con-
struction doesn’t mean to “correct” or to change the intrinsic conceptual 
meaning of philosophical theories, which are de facto already at hand. At 
the contrary, it means to precisely investigate their movements, strategies 
and expressions of thought, and to in! ect (i.e. di" erentially deviate) them 
towards the engagement with distant matters of concern. It means to cre-
ate what Alberto Toscano de# nes as “a  local resolution of disparation, the 
invention of a compatibility between heterogeneous domains and demands: 
an ‘emergence produced by asymmetrical captures correlated in time’.”17
Out of this perspective, it can be seen that ! e Fragmented Orchestra
provides the perfectly matching “artistic matter” to the conceptual move I’m 
interested to follow. First, because it is in itself an expression of the necessity 
of combining elements of knowledge deriving form heterogeneous episte-
mologies (that is from physical, neurophysiological, musical and visual art 
problems), necessity which is re! ected by the di" erent backgrounds of the 
involved actors (the artist Jane Grant, the physicist, musician and composer 
John Matthias, and the composer Nick Ryan).18 Second and more signi# cantly, 
because it has brilliantly resolved the tension between the heterogeneities at 
stake (in the creation of the “tiny brain”, to resume it in synthesis).19
% e question that now opens up, is how the “tiny cortex” qua resolved 
artistic disparation, can enact further # elds of problematic tension, that is to 
produce the conditions for other problematic # elds between heterogeneous 
entities to emerge. In order to address this issue, I introduce the philosophi-
cal concepts relevant to this realm, in terms of a brief geneaological intro-
duction and an analysis of their unfoldings in the thought of Simondon and 
Deleuze. Disparity and individuation are relevant inasmuch they constitute 
the conceptual entities enabling to state the issue of problematic tension 
from a theoretical point of view.
17  Alberto TOSCANO, ! e ! eatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation Between Kant 
and Deleuze. Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 149.
18  MATTHIAS – GRANT – RYAN, “% e Fragmented Orchestra – About the Project.”
19  In this regard it is signi# cant to note that the Fragmented Orchestra was awarded with 
the PRS Foundation New Music Award Prize, recognition being “the most # nancially 
prestigious for new music in the UK and [having] been likened to the Turner Prize for music.” 
(MATTHIAS – GRANT – RYAN, “% e Fragmented Orchestra – About the Project]). However 
it is symptomatic that despite this prestigious recognition there is barely any theoretical essays 
engaging with it. % is is related to the fact that more traditional (art) theory approaches are 
unable to grasp the fundamental heterogeneity at the basis of the work.
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Philosophical concepts: ! e emergence of dramatization.
! e concept of disparity was coined by the French Epistemologist Gilbert Si-
mondon in the late " # ies. Simondon has used this term in order to indicate 
the tension between di$ erent energetic levels as the motor leading towards, 
what he calls, a process of individuation. ! e concept of individuation is 
introduced in order to describe the active element in the emergence and 
becoming of an individual entity. It opens an important philosophical shi# : 
the individual (i.e. the being, any kind of individuated entity), is taken under 
consideration not from the point of view of its full constitution, but from its 
genesis. And even more important, the genesis is not inquired from a move 
a posteriori that is, moving from the perspective of an already constituted 
individual towards the inquiry of its genetic becoming. Rather, individua-
tion describes the process of becoming individual as such.
To set the focus onto a process, onto something that necessarily entails 
a  level of indeterminacy, does not mean that the content becomes vague. 
Quite the contrary. Simondon’s inquiry regards the determination of pre-
cise conditions which are both generative of the process and allow for its 
sustainability. Brian Massumi20 calls them “enabling constraints”. Enabling 
constraints can be seen as juncture knots in order to allow for the onset 
of processes of metastable resonance. Processes of resonance, Simondon
explains, signi" cantly involve an exchange between already constituted be-
ings, but within a systematics which is not yet fully individuated. ! e yet 
individuated part accounts for the ability and the means to produce the 
exchange, the not yet individuated part, constitutes the “elbow room” which 
gives space for the occurrence of novelty, that is, allows for the emergence 
of information which has not yet come to constitution. ! e dimension of 
indetermination allowing both for the openness, but also for the potential 
of novelty, constitutes the dimension of metastability. ! inking in terms of 
resonant metastability within the speci" cs of this " eld allows to open a space 
for both science and arts to be grasped in the dimension of their operative 
emergence.
It was Gilles Deleuze who rapidly picked up Simondon’s notion of dis-
parity and individuation. ! e " # h chapter of his 1968 ontological treatise 
“Di$ erence and Repetition”, starts with the concept of disparity borrowed 
from Simondon. In the reading proposed by Deleuze, disparation does not 
only connect to di$ erent energetic levels but also to the Leibnizian theory of 
20 Brian MASSUMI, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2011, p. 115.
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di! erential calculus. Signi" cantly, this move allows for the inclusion of the 
abstract operative dimension of variables.
Disparation in Deleuze’s understanding stands for an in" nitesimal dif-
ference of intensity. It is conceived as a “di! erence operator” enacting both 
the occurrence of visible phenomena and the production of its complex sur-
rounding relations. It is this operational shi$ , what allows individuation to 
become performative.
Deleuze understands this performative moment in terms of “dramati-
zation”. It is at the level of in" nity, Deleuze explains, that the intensity of 
disparity becomes indistinguishable from its extensity i.e. from its more 
proper physical and sensuous qualities. It is in this way that heterogene-
ous elements are not only able to emerge, but also to acquire a performative
character, as its very constitution accounts at the same time for the creation 
of new relations, of new channels of deep communication. In other terms:
the metastable resonance between di! erent entities, does not only open for 
new levels of communication, but lies at the very onset of their conditions
of creation. Here is where the onset of the transductive condition starts: it
accounts for the actualization, (the becoming real) of the relation between
conditions of creation and modes of metastable communication. In other
terms: the “rigorous analogy” introduced above, can now be de" ned more
precisely in terms of intertwining di! erential processes which involve both 
microsteps of genetic construction and transmission towards another epis-
temic dimension.
“Dramatization”, in Deleuze’s conception, does not only express an 
ontological condition, i.e. a condition of how being and becoming is under-
stood, but entails also a pragmatic aspect, as it can be seen as a „method“
de" ning di! erent modalities of producing a surface of sense.
Two aspects of dramatization are important for the development of the 
current argument.
1) It contributes to change the idea of how knowledge is understood 
and how it gets produced. “Knowledge” in its widest “scienti" c, artistic
and philosophical” dimension is understood here “as a  comprehensive
‘sensing’”21 and not as being limited to human cognitive processes. % is wide 
perspective changes its de" nitions and its generative conditions: knowledge 
is primarily not de" ned as an act of recognition, which would involve a cog-
nitive act of recalling something which was already preconceived, neither
21 Christoph BRUNNER, “Slow Practices 11 % eses.” In: SCHIESSER, G. – BRUNNER, C. 
(eds.) Practices of Experimentation. Zürich: Zürich University of the Arts 2012, p. 59 (58–69).
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as the production of linguistic analogies or visual metaphors, but in terms 
of problematization. A problem is always bound to a " eld in which it can 
be stated, where the means to ‘solve’ it can be assessed, and where also its 
solutions can be found. Moreover, a problem derives from a compulsion to 
create. Parafrasing Isabelle Stengers, “You create (knowlegde) when you 
are forced or obliged to create. You do not create without a ‘cause’.”22 Here
“cause” is not understood in terms of a  linear relation to an e# ect, but as 
an indeterminate connection to a broader dimension of sensibility, to an 
a# ective “territory”. $ is territory is shaped by the occurrence of intensive 
encounters. Encounters can be of any kind: “What is encountered may be 
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of a# ective tones: 
wonder, love, hatred, su# ering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic 
is that it can be only sensed.”23 Sensation is primary inasmuch as it creates 
the necessity to engage.
2) It accounts for the creation of transversal relations between di# erent
modes of creation scienti" c, artistic or philosophical. Transversal relations 
are expressive of the pragmatic unfoldings of the tension between intensities 
and extensities which Deleuze conceived to be the core of the movement of 
“dramatization”. Trasversal relations involve the ability to perceive, to en-
gage into and to create di! erent spatio-temporal modalities. It is the di# eren-
tial relation in space- time conditions, which is constitutive of the intensity 
contributing to demarcate the speci" city of each aesthetic or philosophical 
problem. $ inking in these terms, not only allows to better understand the 
speci" c conditions involved in each situation, but creates also means to " nd 
ruptures into consolidated patterns, and to allow for processes of epistemic 
transduction to happen.
$ e concatenation of a  series of disparate zones of intensities and ex-
tensities lies at the basis of what Deleuze in his book on Michel Foucault,24
understands as the diagram qua concept. Other than the visualization tech-
nique depicting a  relational exchange between di# erent entities, scales or 
points, constituting the common de" nition of the diagram, the conceptual 
term has a double role, that of a  tendency and that of agency. $ e aspect 
22 Cf. Isabelle STENGERS, “Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices.” Cultural Studies 
Review, vol. 11, 2005, no. 1, p. 191 (183–196).
23  Gilles DELEUZE, Di! erence and Repetition. Columbia: Columbia University Press 1995, 
p. 139 [emphasis mine].
24  Gilles DELEUZE, Foucault. London – New York: Continuum 2006.
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of tendency refers on the connection between “yet unrealized potentials”,25
that is to the connection between the intensities at the core of the process of 
dramatization described before. ! e diagram as agency,26 refers instead to
the actualisation of the abstract spatiotemporal modalities in terms of rela-
tions between forces and a" ects, which are always intended to be concrete 
and singular inasmuch as they emerge within a speci$ c dimension.
In what follows, I will discuss the modalities of diagrammatic agency in 
relation to the speci$ c case of ! e Fragmented Orchestra. Furthermore, I will
extend the notion of diagrammatic agency towards that of vectorial transla-
tion, i.e. take into account the possibility to translate the a" ective potential 
of the work of art towards new dimensions of inquiry.
Diagrammatic agency: neuronal plasticity and the physics of sounds
! e aim of this section is to address the question of the endogenous plasticity 
of the “tiny cortex” posed at the end of section two, through the philosophi-
cal toy as diagram which has been discussed in the third part of the current 
article.
As already stated, the plasticity of the “tiny cortex” accounts for a com-
plex relation between disparate sounds and brains. On one side it creates 
a precarious relation between sounds and brain activities at distance between 
each other. On the other it needs to cut out the connection with external 
sensory paths, in order to endorse mechanisms of self generation. In order 
to understand these operations, I will explore the physical basis of sound 
creation which accounts for an analogical translation (in Combes “rigorous” 
understanding) of the concept of plasticity from the realm of neuroscience 
to that of music. ! e plastic action of sound creation is ensured by the activ-
ity of the neurogranular sampler,27 the algorithm at the basis of the arti$ cial 
neuronal activity.
In his book Sound Ideas, Music, Machines and experience Aden Evens 
describes the underlying conceptual methodology, de$ ned as granular 
synthesis. “Granular synthesis approaches sound as very short chunks, or 
grains. One creates a sound by composing these brief grains, each of which is 
25  Christoph BRUNNER, “Diagramm.” Einunddreissig. Das Magazin des Instituts für ! eorie, 
vol. 16–17, 2011, p. 64 (63–65).
26  Eric ALLIEZ, “Diagrammatic Agency Versus Aesthetic Regime of Contemporary Art: 
Ernesto’s Neto’s Anti-Leviethan.” Deleuze Studies - ! e Smooth and the Striated, vol. 6, 2012,
no. 1, p. 10 (6–26).
27 GRANT – MATTHIAS – HODGSON – MIRANDA, “Hearing ! inking,” p. 235.
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a slice of sound that endures between two and two hundred milliseconds.”28
Signi! cantly, the scale of each grain is treated separately from that of the 
whole sound by the assignment of a separate set of parameters. Because of 
this complex division granular synthesis allows to precisely modulate tini-
est sonic variations: it is not only the variation itself but also the variability 
of the variation, which is taken into account. And from a  sonic point of 
view, “variable variation most e# ectively simulates real-world sounds and 
instruments”.29 $ at is, the endogenous plasticity of the arti! cial cortex 
reconstructs the material reality of the geographically sparse sounds by 
modulating them through another endogenous materiality, that of the neu-
rogranular sampler, and at the same time connecting them to the plastic 
material connections in the brains of the listeners. $ rough the modula-
tion of the variability of noise, the granular synthesis comes to transform 
the “stasis and consistency of an exact and determinate quantity”30 which
determines “the formal sterility of the digital” and as such to recreate “the 
rich depth of reality”, i.e. the haecceity of singularity. Evens explains that
actuality, di# erently than the digital,
is not the sum of elemental facts [...], but includes essentially a force of produc-
tivity that sets in motion. What the digital misses, therefore, is not so much 
what falls between its thresholds, but the creative power of the actual, that will 
always defy ! xed or static representation. $ is missing haeccity is not a further 
di# erence, not something about the object that gets missed, for any such thing 
about the object is amenable to digital capture. It is rather a productive di# er-
ence, a not yet-determined, an ontological fuzziness inherent to the actuality 
itself.31
In the same way than the theoretical “basic unit” of disparity, can lead 
to a process of individuation only if set in metastable resonance with a wider 
collective domain, the elementary unit of arti! cial sound is not distinct and 
disconnected. $ e grain is not single but related to “graininess”, “a matter of 
envelopes, layers, densities, variations and the relations among elementary 
grains”32. Furthermore, the activity at the in! nitesimal level of the grain is 
only the minimal step, which in% uences upper levels of magnitude. At the 
28 Aden Evens, Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press 2005, p. 106.
29 Ibid., p. 110 [emphasis mine].
30 Ibid., p. 70.
31 Ibid., p. 70–71.
32 Ibid., p. 116–117.
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stage of the arti! cial neuronal activity of the “tiny cortex”, the graininess is
re" ected in a complex correlation between the rhythmic (and not random)
activity of a single neuron, whose rhythmicity gets complexi! ed (‘polychro-
nized’) by the action of a certain surrounding group of neurons in a pattern 
of mutual reinforcement between the activity of the single cell and that of 
the group.33
Understanding the “tiny cortex” not only from its connective qualities, 
but also from the “friction” of its graininess, requires the introduction of 
a parallel “curettage” at the theoretical level: that is, to take into account 
the “break” produced by the encounter between Deleuze’s philosophy with 
Félix Guattari’s cartographic compositions. “$ eir collaboration,” Stephen 
Zepke explains, “allowed Deleuze to ! nd what he felt was missing in his 
own work, an engagement with real [aesthetico-]political processes”.34 To 
conceive theory in terms of pragmatic engagement with real frictions, re-
quires a shi%  in perspective: the question at stake is not only how concepts 
get dramatized into di& erent methodical con! gurations (i.e., into the possi-
bility to conceive and to express transversal relations between heterocronic 
dimensions), but also how they become actualized into the speci! city of 
an artistic creation (! e Fragmented Orchestra in this case). It is at this 
pragmatic stage, that concepts become “toys”, or “operative constructs” 
as Isabelle Stengers puts it. “Operative constructs” are a “matter of e& ec-
tuation”, and not of “explanation and illustration”,35 inasmuch as they deal 
with the speci! cs of the creation of an assemblage, i.e. of a partial territory 
which has to be yet both discovered and produced. Eric Alliez resumes this 
strategical move from the construction of philosophical concepts, towards 
the onset of a  theory-practice of experimentation, into what he calls the 
“Guattari-Deleuze e& ect”.36
33 See JONES – GRANT – MATTHIAS – HODGSON – RYAN – OUTRAM, “$ e Fragmented 
Orchestra,” p. 298.
34  Stephen ZEPKE, “Eco-Aesthetics: Beyond Structure in the Work of Robert Smithson, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari.” In: HERZOGENRATH, B. (ed.), Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology. 
Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan 2009, p.  200 (200–216). Deleuze and Guattari met in 
1968, the year in which Di" erence and Repetition was ! rst published. $ eir ! rst book written 
together was Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizofrenia I, ! rst published in 1972.
35  Isabelle STENGERS, “Relaying a War Machine?” In: ALLIEZ, E. – GOFFEY, A. (eds.), ! e 
Guattari E" ect. London – New York: Continuum 2011, p. 141 (134–155).
36  Eric ALLIEZ, “Conclusion: $ e Guattari-Deleuze E& ect.” In: ALLIEZ – GOFFEY (eds.), ! e 
Guattari E" ect, pp. 260–274.
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Becoming toy: the aesthetic individuation of ! e Fragmented Orchestra
Getting back to the realm of the “tiny cortex”, the Deleuzo-Guattarian (or 
Guattaro-Deleuzian) “toys” in their very process of becoming individuated, 
allow us now to explore speci! c “spatio-temporal individuations in and 
as the world”.37 " at is, they allow us to investigate how ! e Fragmented 
Orchestra recreates the relations between neuronal ! rings and registers the 
conditions for them to be experienced both onto an aesthetic and onto an 
artistic level.
Rhythm, the authors of a ! ousand Plateaus state, is there where there 
is a transcoded passage “between that which is constructed and that what 
grows naturally, between mutations from the inorganic to the organic [...]
yet without that series constituting a progression”.38 " is transcoded passage
between, is what the ‘tiny cortex’ intrinsically enacts by connecting hetero-
geneous disparities (the recorded sounds and the activity of the brain cells of 
the listeners), and endogenously constructs through the synthetic properties 
of noise. Given the excursus about the material basis of sonic generation, 
I intend now to get closer to the “paradox” of the transcoding mechanism 
of the “tiny cortex”, i.e. to the assertion that the sonic development in the 
neurogranular sampler can only develop endogenously, i.e. by blockage 
of external sensory paths which on the other side constitute its necessary 
source.
We are here in front of a machinic device whose operational input (i.e. its 
feed) is characterized by a connective synthesis between distant singulari-
ties; at the same time it necessitates the disjunction from its sources, in order 
to produce the desired sonic events. Knowing from the Anti-Oedipus that
the “equation” relating connection and disjunction leads to the de! nition of 
conjunction,39 I want to pursue the current inquiry by asking under which
conditions the synthesis of conjunction which Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
in their description of the forces constitutive of a process of subjectivation, 
could be transposed to the realm of an arti! cial device, whose “sense” is that 
of creating sonic events out of the tension between heterogeneus disparities 
pertaining to the collective realm of non-linguistic forms of expression.
37 Stephen ZEPKE, “Becoming a Citizen of the World: Deleuze Between Allan Kaprow and 
Adrian Piper.” In: CULL, L. (ed.), Deleuze and Performance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press 2009, p. 112 (109–125), [emphasis, mine].
38  DELEUZE – GUATTARI, A ! ousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 313.
39 Gilles DELEUZE – Felix GUATTARI, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New 
York: Penguin Books 2009, p. 36–41.
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In the Antio-edipus, the connective synthesis of production is the “pre-
subjective or transsubjective” stage,40 inasmuch as it solely produces relations 
between the heterogeneous singularities of Kleinian “partial objects”. It does 
not involve any cognitive stage, but operates mechanically by the action of 
basic Freudian drives. ! e disjunctive synthesis of recording is “estranging” 
in the sense that it is regulated by anti-productive mechanisms, acting as 
blockers towards the unleash of connective relations. “! e e" ect of anti-
production on the connective syntheses then, is to desexualize desire [...], 
and thereby constitute a surface that records networks of relations among
connections, instead of producing connections themselves.”41 Disjunction 
induces repression, but constitutes also the mechanism for potential free-
dom inasmuch as it registers the conditions of productive connections and 
allows a multiplication and a diversi$ cation of the relations between them; 
it accounts for the psychic ability of registering singularities and forming 
chains.42 It is in the third stage, the conjunctive synthesis, that newly re-
activated productive connections of desire, are attracted to the recording 
surface of disjunctive points, and enact “an entire network of new synthe-
ses”; the points on the disjuncted grid become loci of intensities and enact 
possible paths of becoming. It is only with conjunctive synthesis, that “ “a” 
subject – or rather “some” subjectivity”43 can be discerned. Importantly, the 
subject of the conjunctive synthesis has nothing to do with a $ xed identity, 
inasmuch as this precarious and transitory stage “is a product of its experi-
ences, rather than being their ground or their precondition”44. ! e subject
emerging from experiences,
extracts “a  residual share” of their content as a  sort of “recompense” for its 
perpetual dispossession, [thus becoming] [...] a  supplement, a marginal epi-
phenomenon, a “mere residuum.” It is “a spare part adjacent to the machine,” 
a byproduct of processes that both precede it and go beyond it. [...] And yet, 
there is something splendid and glorious about the subject of the conjunctive 
synthesis – despite its marginality and its transience. For it lives an “experience 
of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable 
40 Steven SHAVIRO, ! e ! ird (Conjunctive) Synthesis [online]. 2008. Available at: <http://
www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=648> [cit. 31. 1. 2013].
41  Eugene W. HOLLAND, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis.
London – New York: Routledge 1999, p. 28 [emphasis, mine].
42  Felix GUATTARI – Gilles DELEUZE, “! e First Positive Task of Schizoanalysis.” In: 
GENOSKO, G. (ed.)! e Guattari Reader. New York – Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 1996, p. 92.
43  HOLLAND, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, p. 36.
44  SHAVIRO, “! e ! ird (Conjunctive) Synthesis.”
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– a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended 
between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked 
intensity stripped of all shape and form.” In other words, it lives a purely aes-
thetic condition.45
It is by a procedure of conceptual extraction of the operations at the basis 
of the Antioedipal production of subjectivity, and their recomposition into
the realm of an arti" cial process of creation of sounds, that we can now start 
to appreciate the “tiny cortex” from its aesthetic dimension: its ‘machinic 
function’ sets the conditions for pure encounters between heterogeneous 
sonic dimensions and their (arti" cial) neurophysiological substrates of 
capture and elaboration. # e basic material procedure of decomposing het-
erogeneous sounds into their graininess, reduces on one side the sound to its 
minimal conditions and in so doing, allows to lie bare (and thus to perceive) 
its qualitative properties such as density and variation. # is means that what 
gets transmitted, is not only the re-composition of disparate heterogeneous 
sounds but also a “residual share”, of the original experience determining 
the conditions of sonic production.
What the wired and wireless internet connections are conveying from 
the fragmented geography of sparse sites to the ear/brains of receivers, is 
not solely a  composite sonic sequence out of sparse singular happenings, 
but also the intensity of the di$ erential relations between the sounds. # e 
“paradox” of the arti" cial conjunction lies in the subtraction intrinsic in
the materiality and process of graininess. Subtraction which produces both
the detachment from the sonic origins and accounts for the creation of new 
tones. It is in the realm of this double articulation that the heterogeneous 
sonic elements get interlaced into the dynamics of a  “stronger synthesis”.
Deleuze and Guattari explain:
It is clear that what is necessary to make sound travel, and to travel around 
sound, is very pure and simple sound, an emission or wave without harmonics 
[...]. # e more rare" ed the atmosphere, the more disparate elements you will 
" nd. Your synthesis of disparate elements will all be the stronger if you proceed 
with a  sober gesture, an act of consistency, capture or extraction that works 
in a material that is no longer meager but prodigiously simpli" ed, creatively 
limited, selected. For there is no imagination outside of technique.46
45 Ibid.
46  DELEUZE – GUATTARI, A " ousand Plateaus, p. 344–345.
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! e technical construction of the “tiny cortex”, is what shapes the 
overall aesthetic (and artistic) dimension of ! e Fragmented Orchestra. ! e 
algorithmic modelization of its basic elements, the grains, allows for the 
creation of “time patterns and rhythms”, which on one side reproduce the 
‘internal’ neurological rhythms, as they derive from the implementation of 
a mathematical model simulating neurophysiological activity in the brain47. 
! e ‘e# ect’ of this reconstruction which follows certain neurophysiological 
paths of the brain (that of the cerebral cortex) in a deep and precise way 
but nonetheless does it arti" cially, is that of an estrangement: the “‘internal’
neurological rhythms”, which the granular synthesis reshapes, “appear 
unfamiliar to us”48. ! is is because the granular element acts as a threshold 
and thus introduces a new “sensual boundary: below a duration of around 
twenty milliseconds, all sounds are perceived as ‘clicks’ and it is impossible 
for us to distinguish the frequencies of the sound sources”.49
! e granulation thus produces a new sonic event which in its very act of 
becoming, “circumvents any ‘motor’ action, which we would expect to oc-
cur in a real brain/body in which a sense precedes processing which causes 
action”.50 It does it by extracting, through a process of subtraction, both 
from the brain/body physiology and from the sounds in nature the “rare-
$ ed atmosphere” which Deleuze and Guattari conceive as being necessary 
in order to reorganize the sonico-physiological material into a novel ‘plane’ 
of constistency. ! e very moment in which the motor action is prevented on 
a physiological level (in the body/brain of the listeners), is also that in which 
it gets arti$ cially extended in the processing of the ‘tiny cortex’ itself. It is the
schizo-event of ‘cutting’ certain physiological spatiotemporal-conditions 
and ‘pasting’ them as a process of construction of a distant and ‘neutral’ 
nervous system, which allows for the re-con$ guration of the sensual input 
on a wider level. Out of this perspective, the “tiny cortex” constitutes a basis 
for a “strong synthesis” of the disparate, basis which is both material (it con-
sists into the activity of a portion of arti$ cially reconstructed cortex) and 
immaterial (the arti$ cial neurons are not bound to any “real” physiological 
process) and whose degree of consistency is determined by extraction and 
creative selection of and from its sources.
47  IZHIKEVICH – GALLY – EDELMAN, “Spike-Timing Dynamics of Neuronal Groups.”
48  GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi% ing Topographies: Sound and the Fragmented Orchestra,” 
p. 57.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 58.
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How do all these technical considerations, concerning the materiality 
and the arti" ciality (i.e. the formation) of ! e Fragmented Orchestra, concur 
towards a (possible) grasping of its aesthetic and artistic value? # e process of 
composition between heterogeneities which gets synthesized into the sonic 
event and subsequently rearranged into the formation of neurophysiological 
states, " ts into the realm of the Whitehedian “aesthetics of the Beautiful”51, 
i.e. an aesthetics in which the “production of the new” does not arise from 
a gesture of overcoming (the real), but instead emerges out of a transforma-
tion of existing heterogeneous forms of expression towards the constitution 
of novel singularities.52 Stephen Shaviro emphasizes the importance of this
understanding of aesthetics in terms of a (political) “act of resistance”53. If
practices of “sampling, recombination and reappropriation”54 do constitute
a common generality in contemporary capitalist culture, the aesthetic con-
cern becomes that of redirecting the “logic” of these practices towards the 
“novelty” of beauty. Because novelty and beauty are currently abused and 
misused in such a heavy and omnipresent manner, it becomes all the more 
important to evaluate them according to their enabling potential towards 
generating what Whitehead understands as a “creative event”.55
Whitehead de" nes beauty as “the mutual adaptation of the several fac-
tors in an occasion of experience”;56 adaptation is never happening casually, 
but “implies an end”, an aim which emerges in the process of adaptation 
itself. # e aim does not predetermine experience but rather constitutes its 
consequence. # is perspective, Shaviro states, “is what opens the doors to 
novelty. Every achievement of unity is something that has never existed be-
fore: something di$ erent, something radically new”.57 Novelty arises when 
multiple entities reach the level of unity, a unity which is never permanent, 
but only in “continual transition”. # e fact that novelty cannot be deter-
51 Steven SHAVIRO, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press 2009, p. 151. In this regard it is relevant to note that Shaviro’s argumentative 
line towards this idea of aesthetics, unfolds through the development of the three Antioedipal 
syntheses explained before. # is, he states, is the crucial moment in which Deleuze and 
Guattari encounter Marx and, indirectly, Whitehead (p. 125–127).
52 Alfred N. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality (Gi" ord Lectures Delivered in the University of 
Edinburgh During the Session 1927-28). Detroit: Free Press 1979, p. 21.
53  # is de" nition originates from Gilles DELEUZE, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and 
Interviews 1975–1995. Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e) 2007, p. 317.
54  SHAVIRO, Without Criteria, p. 171.
55 Ibid., p. 154–157.
56  Alfred N. WHITEHEAD, Adventures of Ideas. Detroit: Free Press,1967, p. 252.
57  SHAVIRO, Without Criteria, p. 73.
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mined in terms of a particularity which establishes it, doesn’t mean that it is 
boundless; Whitehead’s whole ontology ‘grounds’ in creativity. ”Creativity is 
an ultimate principle and a universal ground, only because – and precisely 
because – it is featureless and neutral, entirely without a  character of its 
own”.58 Because of its generic neutrality this ultimate principle cannot be 
determined by any “metaphysical authorization”, or by an “ethical impera-
tive”; instead it requires aesthetic constraints. By drawing a relation between 
the philosophies of Kant and Whitehead, Shaviro proposes to elaborate 
a “constructivist account of the conditions of receptivity, or sensibility”59; 
that is, he identi" es aesthetic constraints as the necessary conditions which 
account for the production of novelty.
From this brief outline, we understand that the beauty of ! e Fragmented 
Orchestra can be grasped in the aesthetic process of constructing the generic 
“tiny cortex”. # at is, in the operation of redirecting sounds, perceptions, 
neuronal activity pertaining to speci" c subjects or objects towards a  level 
of impersonal and therefore indi$ erent ‘grounding’. # is is a gesture that 
a%  rms the “ubiquity of creativity”,60 i.e. that creation can come from any 
kind of human and non-human sources (or resources). It is this ubiquity that 
accounts for the emergence of beauty in a potential state, I.e it demarcates 
a  general compatibility for integration, without yet producing the act of 
integration itself.61
With the ideas of novelty and beauty, Whitehead provides the enabling 
conceptual means by which the question of the consistency necessary for 
synthesizing the disparate can be framed onto an aesthetic level. Because 
these notions derive from the a%  rmation of creativity in its widest under-
standing, they “respond to the singularity of every occasion of experience”.62
From this point of view, the procedure of sonic extraction by granular 
synthesis is a novel recon" guration of diverse peripheral sounds in distant 
relation with accidental listeners.
What remains to be discussed now, is how to frame ! e Fragmented 
Orchestra from its artistic side. # at is, how the Whiteheadian concepts 
of novelty and beauty can be understood in their actualization within the
speci" city of the “process of production” enacted by the artwork. I will pro-
ceed with the question of how the sonic production under consideration can
58 Ibid., p. 150.
59 Ibid., p. 51.
60 Ibid., p. 158.
61 Ibid., p. 73.
62 Ibid., p. 150.
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be thought in terms of transforming the “residual share” emerging out of the 
third conjunctive synthesis into the pragmatics of a collective enunciation 
in the realm of art. Enunciation is here understood in terms of the de" ni-
tion that Félix Guattari gave in his last book Chaosmosis; as the emergence 
of a collective “logic of non-discursive intensities”63, i.e. the valorization of 
all “pre-personal, polyphonic, collective and machinic”64 modes of produc-
tion, which are currently kept suppressed by the semiotic one. It is by the 
inclusion of this complex and rich tissue of singularities within the realm of 
theory, that the “novelty” characterizing the sonic event of ! e Fragmented 
Orchestra, can be grasped conceptually.
Second Squaring: art as a process of collective synaptogenesis
In the previous paragraph I  have introduced the Whitehedian notion of 
beauty in terms of a  conceptual de" nition. # e question to be addressed 
now, is how beauty gets constructed within the realm of the constraints 
relative to the artwork under consideration. Otherwise stated, how the het-
erogeneous “occasions of experience”, are adapted into the formation of the 
artistic “object”.
# e " rst problematic issue in this regard, is that although ! e Frag-
mented Orchestra, “covered a vast area of physical space”, the ‘object’ did not 
exist as such. Grant and Matthias clarify:
Whilst there were 24 connected sites and a  central exhibition area, the real 
‘space’ of the work was in the connectivity of the sites, the in between, in the 
temporal " ring events of the work. All that was evident regarding the materi-
als of the work were speakers, ‘soundboxes’, wires, microphones, and a central 
“listening space”.65
Given these conditions, the question arises, why the distinction between 
art and aesthetics should still be maintained. In “art and experience”, John 
Dewey66 has de" ned as artistic the moment of the making of art, and as
aesthetic its perceptual potential, i.e. the experience that one can make out of 
it. Given the complex system of feedbacks between sonic inputs and the reac-
63 Felix GUATTARI, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1995, p. 22.
64 Ibid., p. 21.
65  GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi$ ing Topographies,” p. 55–56.
66  John DEWEY, Art as Experience. New York: Perigee Trade 2005, p. 162.
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tions of the listeners, it is clear that ! e Fragmented Orchestra has blurred 
these categories from their very roots. ! e reason why I nonetheless propose 
to make use of these concepts, is because I want to question them in terms 
of their relation in-between. ! at is, I want to understand them as operative 
constraints along the de# nition given by Stengers, and ask about how they 
can be reshaped by the conditions set by the artwork. First of all, the current 
artistic frame accounts for the necessity of rede# ning the “artistic object” in 
terms of a fragmentary complexity without speci# c locality.
In order to address the issue of grasping the non local dynamics from 
an artistic point of view, I follow Stephen Zepke’s thesis, according to which 
Félix Guattari “remakes” the Duchampian readymade by fragmenting art 
into “polyphonic” and “multiplicatory” processes of individuation. Guattari,
Zepke argues, has transposed the Duchampian ‘nominalist’ paradigm – ac-
cording to which everyone is able to consciously decide about what is to be
considered art – in the realm of an aesthetic paradigm “that does not e$ ace 
art but marks its renewed relevance within contemporary life”.67 ! e Du-
champian aesthetic decision, generic inasmuch as it could come from any ra-
tional being, is transposed into the indi$ erence of a proto-aesthetic68 – realm; 
the semiotic act of speaking out a decision gets translated into an “event of 
enunciation” which includes a wider range of human and non-human mo-
dalities of expression.69 Zepke exempli# es the shi%  from the readymade as
67  ZEPKE, “Becoming a Citizen of the World,” p. 112.
68  ! e term protoaesthetic is an expression by Guattari, by which he intends to emphasise that 
his focus does not lie on “institutionalized art, to its works manifested in the social # eld, but 
to a dimension of creation in a nascent state, perpetually in advance of itself”. GUATTARI, 
Chaosmosis, p. 102.
69  Zepke’s argument is that Guattari‘s reading turns the Duchampian “conceptual readymade” 
into an “a$ ectual readymade”. ! e parallel examination of Duchamp‘s oeuvre with the work 
of the Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin, allowed Guattari to revalue aesthetically not 
the object itself but the involved creative act. With this move, Guattari kept from Duchamp 
the desideratum of an ‘aesthetics of indi$ erence’, unbounded from a speci# c actor, skill or 
taste. On the other, he strongly rejected the mental operation of consciousness at the basis 
of the readymade as “object” (the “nominalism” by which art gets valued). See ZEPKE,
“Becoming a  Citizen of the World.” Out of this argumentative line Zepke has begun to 
retrace the conditions for an alternative geology of contemporary art, along the work of John 
Cage, Allan Kaprow, Robert Smithson, and Adrian Piper, as well as articulating its political 
potential (see Stephen ZEPKE, “From Aestehtic Autonomy to Autonomist Aesthetics: Art and 
Life in Guattari.” In: ! e Guattari E" ect, pp. 205–219. My former analysis of the graphical
notations of the composer Anestis Logothetis is situated in this line of research. See Claudia 
MONGINI, “Sign and Information: On Anestis Logothetis’ Graphical Notations.” In: ZEPKE 
S. – O’SULLIVAN S. (eds.), Deleuze and Contemporary Art.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press 2010, p. 227–245.
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object to the ‘event’ of “making ready”, in the discussion of the score which 
Allan Kaprow associated to his performances “Happenings”. Especially in 
the work a! er 1961, Kaprow spoke in terms of score – i.e. explicitly import-
ing the concept of musical notation in the sphere of performative art – as 
a possibility for projecting the sheer magnitude and unforseeable details in 
the real world” onto a neutral plane. # e project was to create a “plan(e) of 
composition”, whose organizational principle gets directly constructed in 
“the Happening in an ongoing, aleatory and autopoietic feedback loop [...] in 
which the question of individual subjective expression is subsumed by that 
of the construction of an individuation of the world.”70
# e neutral “plane” re-constructing the happening in terms of individu-
ation, is the element allowing to draw a line of continuity between Kaprow’s 
score and the “tiny cortex” of ! e Fragmented Orchestra. In the last case, 
the operative conditions of the “score” are de$ ned by the way the arti$ cial 
neurons of the “tiny cortex” treat the incoming sound. # is mechanism, 
called neurogranular sampler,71 is the speci$ c algorithmic implementation 
of the idea of granular synthesis described before; it triggers (i.e. extracts) 
grains of sound from the original pattern. “# e resulting sound therefore 
consists of short bursts of the original sample triggered by the cortical neu-
rons. It is a soni$ cation of the cortical $ ring patterns.”72 # is means that the 
heard result is the activity of the neurons, $ lled up with the content of the 
original sound. # e arti$ cial neurons of the “tiny cortex” thus transform the 
speci$ city of a particular sound into an “indi% erent” shape, which nonethe-
less reproduces the tension of the original tonalities. # e neuronal action 
contracts the original sound and in so doing extracts its “residual share”, i.e. 
its expressive modalities.73 It unleashes the sonic forces to a bare state of sen-
sation and recomposes them into a new chain of machinic processes. A con-
junctive chain: its connectivity creatively plays out its non-connectivity by 
accentuating the sheer presence of “the unexpungeable di% erence between 
the sheer individuality of [sonic and perceptive] events”.74
Sound as a mean of expression as such, becomes of prior signi$ cance in 
the constitution of this realm of generic indi% erence, inasmuch as “it has the 
70 Ibid., p. 113.
71 Eduardo MIRANDA – John MATTHIAS, “Music Neurotechnology for Sound Synthesis: 
Sound Synthesis with Spiking Neuronal Networks.” Leonardo, vol. 42, 2009, no. 5, 
pp. 439–442.
72  GRANT – MATTHIAS – HODGSON – MIRANDA, “Hearing # inking,” p. 235.
73  EVENS, Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience, p. 18–19.
74 MASSUMI, Semblance and Event, p. 21.
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ability to create a space without a tangible physical presence”.75 Sound opens
the pathway towards the creation of what Guattari calls “partial modules 
of temporalization”, a break with the “hypothetical projection” of “a  time 
of generalized equivalence”.76 " at is, sound or better said the procedure
of becoming sonic (“soni# cation”) modulates di$ erent spatio-temporal
conditions by recomposing them into a novel dimension. It di$ erentiates 
space-time situations and creates what Deleuze calls “spatio-temporal dyna-
misms: that is [...] agitations of space, holes of time, pure syntheses of space, 
direction and rhythms.” “" ese dynamisms”, Deleuze continues, “always 
presuppose a # eld in which they are produced, outside of which they would 
not be produced”77. " us the question arises, how to de# ne the # eld of action 
proper to the artwork.
At the geo-macroscopical level of temporality, because of the lack of consistent 
service of internet broadband lines, an arti# cial latency was built in into the 
sonic transmission, in order to avoid cuts in the stream. " is had the e$ ect that 
“a sound event is not echoed back for several seconds of time. " ough not inten-
tional, this serves to accentuate the vast distances travelled by audio signals out 
of the geographical network.” " is latency constituted the refrain of the broad 
geographical space.78
" is broad latency resonated with the time holes given by the micro-
scopic delays in nerve cell transmission at the level of the brain of the listen-
ers. Axonal conduction delays refer to the time required for a nervous signal 
to travel from its initiation site at the centre of the cell, towards its periphery 
terminals, where transmission to other neurons gets enacted through syn-
apses. " ese delays get to assume a wider signi# cance when the activity of 
more cells is taken under consideration, as they concur to shape the strengths 
of the connections between groups of neurons. “Tipically, a connection will 
be increased if a pre-synaptic neuron causes a postsynaptic neuron to # re. 
" e connection is depressed if the # ring of the postsynaptic neuron occurs 
before the pre-synaptic neuron has # red, a phenomenon known as ‘Spike-
Timing Dependent Plasticity’.”79
75 GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi% ing Topographies,” p. 56.
76  GUATTARI, Chaosmosis, p. 16.
77  Gilles DELEUZE, Desert Islands And Other Texts, 1953–1974. Lapoujade, D. (ed.). 
Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e) 2004, p. 94–95.
78  JONES – GRANT – MATTHIAS – HODGSON – RYAN – OUTRAM, “" e Fragmented 
Orchestra,” p. 300–301.
79  GRANT – MATTHIAS, “Shi% ing Topographies: Sound and the Fragmented Orchestra,” p. 55.
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By means of its operation of heterogeneous reassembling, the “tiny 
cortex” counteractualizes80 both the virtual cavities of the web and the
neurophysiological gaps in the brain into another fragmental dimension: 
the synthetic action of sound-grains. It makes the rhythmic nature of sound 
explicit, inasmuch as it lies bare its “intense moments of widely varying 
lengths”81. It does this by extracting the time movements from speci! c mate-
rial conditions – the functional shi"  of the di# erential equations originally 
envisaged to model human neuronal activity and the internet delay – and 
recomposing them at the level of another physical motor: the graininess of 
the arti! cial grains. Duchamp’s “artistic object” is thus pushed at its very 
limit of dissolution; at the point in which the semiotic circuitry between the 
object and its nominal collective judgement crumbles and gets recomposed 
into “an abstract machinic transversality”.82 $ e “tiny cortex” reshapes 
di# erent temporalities into a generic mutative form which partains to the 
rich enunciative registers of a generic polivocal collectivity. By establishing 
complex (non)local relations between singular neuro-sonic disparities, the 
Fragmented Orchestra rewires the plastic modulations at the level of single 
brains into a wider circuitry entailing the potential for a collective neuronal 
regeneration. New sonic formations induce di# erent sensual experiences 
which might become the onset for an enhanced synapto-genetic formation 
in single brains. $ ese novel particular con! gurations feed back into the 
collective ability to react plastically to the plasticity of our brains.83
It is at this level of practical mutual action, that an ethical component 
can be perceived in its emergence. An ethics which is not the ‘philosophical 
imperative’ the way Shaviro has criticised it, but an “enabling constraint” 
for a wider dimension of ethico-aesthetic experimentation. A concomitant
creation of the conditions for an emergent collective sensibility, in which the 
philosophical toy intervenes in terms of a partial actant.
80  $ is concept is explained by Deleuze in Negotiations (Gilles DELEUZE, Negotiations 
1972–1990. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 202); it denotes the action upon any 
kind of activity channelled into prede! ned paths and roles, and its operative transformation 
into a new dimension of composition.
81 EVENS, Sound Ideas, p. 116.
82  GUATTARI, Chaosmosis, p. 107.
83  Catherine MALABOU, What Should We Do with Our Brain? New York: Fordham University 
Press 2008, p. 30.
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